
Política Externa
Apresentador de Trabalho Completo

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RESUMO

Brasil e Moçambique conheceram modificações consideráveis em suas condições no sistema internacional na última década. As relações entre ambos passam a conter elementos de "pragmatismo" comercial, via espaços abertos a empresas brasileiras no mercado moçambicano, e de "solidariedade" via Cooperação Sul-Sul (CSS), em virtude, por exemplo, do fortalecimento do Aparelho de Estado moçambicano e da alta capacidade de internacionalização de algumas do Serviço Público Federal brasileiro. Dada a especificidade da última década no histórico da relação, como pode ser analisada a presença brasileira em Moçambique a partir dos canais oficiais da Política Externa Brasileira (PEB) e da CSS? O trabalho avança que "pragmatismo" e "solidariedade" pertencem a lógicas distintas na presença brasileira, revelado a partir da análise integrada da relação entre Política Externa e demais Políticas Públicas brasileiras. Para tal, seria preciso considerar a mudança de papel do MRE na condução da PEB, dada a crescente participação de outros atores. Nesse sentido, a "solidariedade" é examinada em um projeto de CSS da ENAP. Já o "pragmatismo" é avaliado a partir do comércio bilateral e do IED brasileiro. O trabalho conclui ressaltando a importância da avaliação da presença externa do Brasil a partir de modelos integrados que considerem o papel de novos atores/instituições e dos processos políticos internos.

Palavras-Chave: Política Externa Brasileira, Cooperação Sul-Sul, Administração Pública Brasileira, África, Moçambique
1. Introduction

As a starting point to discuss the Brazilian relations with Africa and, more specifically, the relation between foreign policy objectives and South-South Cooperation, this article assumes that emerging countries are already competing for potential emerging markets in the Southern hemisphere. The central idea of the article is that Africa is now a distinguished stage for emerging power politics or, in other words, a political arena where the contradictions in the new multilateral blocs like BRICS and IBSA may arise.\(^1\) The surge of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in key sectors of the African economy,\(^2\) the growing interest of the Indian private sector in the new African middle classes, the South African spread to other African markets (allied to the country’s natural claim of leadership in Africa)\(^3\) and, finally, the Brazilian re-launch of the “Atlantismo”\(^4\) are all important ingredients that may change the relations among the emerging powers in a near future.

Therefore, it is proposed that the analysis should shift its focus from an image-projection discourse to an effective-presence in key African countries, a change that may provide material grounds for comparison. The article contends that the presence of Brazil can be approached by combining the economic indicators of investment/trade with the impact indicators of technical cooperation projects, which also demand an analysis of domestic politics/decision-making. “Pragmatism” and “solidarity” are terms usually employed by the media and the specialized literature on International Relations to capture the contours of the Brazilian Foreign Policy towards a region. Therefore, the article will associate the terms to the economic presence and the impact of the technical cooperation projects. Thus, can it be argued that Brazilian international cooperation is horizontal and imposes no conditions to partners? Is it really demand driven? How can we assess “pragmatism” and “solidarity at the same time? Does one contribute to explaining the other? And finally, is technical cooperation an instrument of the Brazilian foreign policy or the analysis of issue-area policy process provides a better approach to the subject? Those are some background questions that the article will address.

\(^1\) See: (1) HARMAN, S. & BROWN, W. “In from the margins: the changing place of Africa in International Relations”. In International Affairs 89: 1 (2013), pg 78; and (2) LECHINI, Gladys. “BRICS e África: A grande incógnita”. In Boletim de Economia e Política Internacional Nº 9 (Janeiro-Março), 2012. Pg 140.
\(^2\) BROADMAN, Harry. “China and India go to Africa: new deals in the developing world”. In Foreign Affairs 87, 2 (March-April 2008), pg 95-101.
\(^3\) ALDEN, Chris & SHOEMAN, Maxi. “South Africa in the company of giants: the search for leadership in a transforming global order”. In International Affairs 89, 1 (2013), pg 111-129.
The article uses a case study methodology, focusing on Mozambique, which seems appropriate for testing the argument, considering that: (i) Historically, it is an area of influence of South Africa; (ii) Mozambique and Brazil have shared cultural identities, most of which derived from the colonial presence of Portugal; (iii) It has massive natural reserves and infrastructure projects that Chinese, Brazilian and Indian companies have been investing during the last years; (iv) Mozambique is considered to be a successful case arisen from the traditional assistance for development in post-conflict countries.

As a case study to test the argument, the article examines a bilateral cooperation project between Brazil and Mozambique in the field of public administration. The main criterion for choosing the case was its close relation to the state-building efforts carried out by the Government of Mozambique, best understood in the context of the two Public Sector Reform Programmes of 2001-2005 and 2006-2011.

2. Africa: The newest stage of emerging-power politics

The post-Cold War International Order can be divided in two clear periods. The first is generally conceived as a mix of temporary concentration of hegemonic power in the United States and the promotion of solid policies stimulating the global flows of capital, especially among the self-labeled “developed countries”. The second one is marked by the crisis in the traditional capitalist economies and the empowerment of China, India, Brazil, and other “emerging countries”. The latter brought up a new debate on the relation between regionalism and multilateralism, turning Africa into an important test for the emerging power increased participation in managing the world affairs. The article now turns its attention to such debates.

2.1 What are China and India doing in Africa?

The current situation of Africa is radically different from a decade before. Africa was the fastest-growing regional economy on earth during the period 2000-2009 and it is also the host region for 11 of fastest-growing countries, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 04/2011). Based on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) data,

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Africa displayed an average of growth above 6% in the 2005-2008 period and estimates an average of 5% for the 2011-2013 period.\(^8\) In addition, the incidence of conflicts in the African continent has decreased considerably, undermining the traditional military-based definitions of security in favor of a multifaceted understanding of the term, by introducing elements of material inequality, justice and citizenship.\(^9\)

The indicators of the recent past may easily lead to optimistic scenarios about the future performance of the African economies. Fast urbanization process, emerging urban middle classes and the abundance of commodities are regarded as the main reasons why Africa may be seen as the golden investment opportunity in terms of return rates.\(^10\) For some analysts, Africa is the last frontier of the capitalist system. As true as it may sound, a twofold analysis is needed to avoid wishful thinking about the impacts on the African societies. First of all, it is mandatory to understand the presence of both China and India in the African Continent. Secondly, it is necessary to understand and map the gaps and weaknesses of African public/governmental institutions, so that the African societies are capable of benefiting from the new changing patterns in FDI. Chinese and Indian presence in Africa will be reviewed below, while the Brazilian presence will be discussed in the following topic.

Reporting in the late 2007, the UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has remarked that Asia had only recently become a significant source of FDI in Africa. The reason the Commission pointed out for the small FDI growth from Asia in comparison to other regions was that African markets were small and their development level generally low. In addition, the Commission discussed the effects of high transaction costs associated with low knowledge of the local markets, poor regulatory frameworks and also that Asian companies are usually looking for knowledge-intensive labor force.\(^11\) What has changed since then?

As mentioned before, the 2008 economic crisis had different impacts throughout the world. Developing countries like China, India and Brazil stimulated the appetite of their local consumer markets through state-oriented policies with considerable degree of success. Africa, in its turn, benefited both from the quick economic measures adopted by the Chinese

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\(^10\) DORR, Norbert et al. “The African miracle: how the world’s charity case became its best investment opportunity”. In Foreign Policy 183 (December 2010); THE ECONOMIST, “The sun shines bright: the continent’s impressive growth looks likely to continue”. In The Economist (Print Edition), 3\(^{rd}\) December, 2011.

and Indian governments and also from financial flows of the Arab Gulf, which helped maintaining the level of investments in infrastructure projects guided by NEPAD strategy. Considering that the North American interest in Africa has remained considerably stable from the end of the Cold War until recently and that the investment capacity of traditional partners from Europe slightly declined after the 2008 crisis, Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments grew in Africa.\(^\text{12}\)

There seems to be a consensus among analysts that Chinese interests in Africa are mainly centered on guaranteeing a safe supply of minerals, energy and other commodities for maintaining the sustainability of its economic growth and, to a lesser extent, developing local consumer markets as a “safe haven” for the surplus of Chinese manufactured products. Recent trends in the Chinese-African political and economic relations support this general perception.

Although the Chinese FDI in Africa dates back to the 80s, it was not until 2000 that an official cooperation strategy with the African Continent was formalized. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was officially established as a coordination mechanism for reaching consensus, cooperation and equal participation among China and 50 African States, but the two major agenda items of the 1\(^\text{st}\) Ministerial Conference posed two questions that went much further than merely trade and political understanding: “1. In what way should we work towards the establishment of a new international political and economic order in the 21st century? 2. How should we further strengthen Sino-African economic cooperation and trade under the new circumstances?\(^\text{13}\)

The FOCAC consultation mechanism is three-layered.\(^\text{14}\) The Ministerial Conferences are held every three years and are attended by the Foreign Ministers of each country as well as the ministers-in-charge of economic cooperation. Senior Official preparatory meetings precede the Ministerial Conferences in a few days and are usually attended by director-level officials of competent departments of government. Follow-up meetings take place every year in China between Chinese and African diplomats and also a year before each Ministerial Meeting, when Senior Officials of each country discuss the status of cooperation. Finally, the 3\(^\text{rd}\) Ministerial Conference (4-5 November 2006) decided to establish an additional mechanism for political consultation between the parties, gathering foreign ministers in New York every year after the Ministerial Conferences, during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).\(^\text{15}\)

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13 [http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dyjbzjhyy/Cl12009/t157578.htm](http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dyjbzjhyy/Cl12009/t157578.htm)
14 [http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/ljij/t933522.htm](http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/ljij/t933522.htm)
In the period 2000-2012 five Ministerial Meetings took place and four Action Plans (2004-2006, 2007-2009, 2010-2012 and 2013-2015) were put forward to strengthen Africa-China relations. Actions are concentrated in strategic areas such as human resources training, export credit lines for African Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and other African States, preferential loans and preferential export-buyer’s credit, promotion of local development projects financed by Chinese-African Development Funds, agriculture, local stimulus for scientific and technological development, provision of scholarships, deployment of Chinese physicians, amongst others. Recent data released by the African Development Bank (AfDB) confirm that the Chinese cooperation efforts are effectively translated into economic results: the share of Chinese trade with Africa grew from 4.7% in 2000 to 13.9% in 2009. Chinese trade with Africa represented nearly 40% of the total African trade between Africa and its Emerging Partners in 2009, while the Official Development Assistance (ODA) represented 25% of the total assistance of Emerging Partners to Africa during the same year.

Even though India has recently proposed a similar initiative, the India-Africa Forum, there are sound differences in what concerns the internationalization of Indian businesses in comparison to the Chinese model, which is strongly State-centered. Firstly, African-Indian relations have historical roots, dating back to the commerce between the territories during the British colonial occupation. Secondly, nearly 10% of the “Indian diaspora” is located in Africa. Finally, even though the Indian State has participation in the internationalization and investment efforts, a great deal of transactions is business driven. Indian efforts in Africa seem to be linked to the economic rationale of expansion to guarantee sustained growth and also to the raising fears associated to the current expansion of investments promoted by China in Africa. Differently from China, the expansion to Africa does not seem to be linked to a grand and unified State-strategy.

The India-Africa forum comprises several areas of cooperation. Although China covers a vast array of issue areas, Indian cooperation is strongly directed towards technical assistance and capacity-building, especially in the fields of education, training, and technological assistance. Another sound difference from China is the fact that Indian projects are directly funded instead of adopting the traditional model of “grant supply”.

The changing presence of India in Africa is also captured by economic indicators. The AfDB estimates that the Indian share of African trade has more than doubled from 2000 to 2009, rising from 2.3% to 5.1%. Among the emerging partners, India represented 14.1% of

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the total trade in 2009. Finally, ODA from India represented almost 10% of the total ODA from emerging partners in 2009.

2.2 Brazil-Africa relations: only pragmatism?

Analysts usually stress that continuity and stability are remarkable traits of the Brazilian Foreign Policy. Their arguments are usually based on cultural-historical considerations that, among other factors, emphasize: (i) the normative-idealist character of foreign policy discourse/practice and the projection of the Brazilian image in the international system; (ii) the relation between the consolidated bureaucracy represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the stability of the Foreign Policy goals in the long run. Even though both factors seem to raise important research questions about the general layout in which the Brazilian Foreign Policy operates, as well as how behaviors are framed by the historical-built bureaucratic politics, they usually help emphasizing what has remained stable in relation to what has changed. In what concerns the Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Brazil-Africa relations during the 2002-2012 period one additional debate is imperative: the role of new actors in both the formulation/practice of foreign policy and also their effective impact in the Brazilian presence in third countries.

The arguments on the uniqueness of foreign policy vis-à-vis other public policies are essentially rooted in assumptions about the self-help character of state relations. According to such arguments only centralization and vertical control over foreign policy formulation/practice in the domestic system would guarantee the necessary coherence in external affairs and avoid the greater evil, war. The argument holds less true, however, if the analyst turns his attention to some contemporary trends in the international system, such as the low use of force among States and the radical changes in the way people communicate and form networks across borders.

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A second set of arguments take as assumptions the short-term considerations of political leaders in democratic systems as well as the resulting inconsistence in priorities/commitments over time due to the decentralized character of power in democracies. Both worldviews are based on a Realist epistemology of the unitary-state and fail to capture that the foreign policy formulation/practice in democracies is a direct result of the domestic political processes. The international system plays a significant role in setting the extent to which the resulting foreign policy priorities can be pursued. The former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs seems to agree that “In a democracy, foreign policy is one amidst a number of foreign policies. It ought to be subject to the scrutiny of public opinion and be mindful of people’s will as expressed at the ballot box.”

Such understanding is paramount for framing the processes pertaining to the Brazilian-African relations during the 2002-2012 period, once it permits an interplay of three political instances: (i) the economic rise of Africa; (ii) the role of the President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in promoting the rebirth of Brazilian relations with Africa; (iii) the emergence of new actors from different public arenas in the formulation/practice in foreign policy, especially in what concerns the relation between the foreign policy and international cooperation. The first issue has already been discussed in previous topics and the third issue will be discussed thoroughly in the following session with focus on Mozambique. Attention will now be turned to Lula’s foreign policy for Africa and its impacts on trade and FDI.

Brazilian Foreign Policy is generally known for its focus on consensus and for advancing ideas and proposals that may lead to a transformation “from within” the international order. As the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Lula administration has stated more than once, Brazil is in a permanent struggle to promote democratic values and reduce the inequality among states in international order. In this vein, some analysts emphasize that multilateralism is a historic pillar of Brazilian Foreign Policy. Other commentators stress that the Brazilian preference for multilateralism is in fact a strategy of articulating the norms and principles that constitute the international structure/order to promote the national interest without relying on force or threats, known as “Consensual Hegemony”. Although the interpretations on the use of the discourse to accomplish foreign policy objectives vary, the

24 CARDOSO Jr, José et. al. (Coord.). “Capítulo 9 – Arranjo institucional para formulação e implementação da política externa no Brasil”. In CARDOSO JR, José et. al. (Coord). Inserção internacional brasileira: temas de política externa – Volume 1. Brasília: IPEA, 2010. Pg 327-360.  
27 BURGES, Sean. “Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War”. In International Relations 22 (1), 2008, pg 65-84.
image of Brazil as a negotiating power holds still. As an analyst has recently remarked, Brazil intends to be seen as “(…) the ultimate soft-power power”.28

The contemporary image Brazil projects to the world about itself holds true for its relations with Africa. The Lula administration promoted an important political turn in Brazil-Africa relations based on the historic/cultural roles and on shared economic-political interests. In fact, and from a historical point of view, Africa had (and still has) a constitutive role for the Brazilian society.29 Far from being based on material grounds, Brazil has a cultural debt with the African societies. On the other hand, Africa also plays an important role in the contemporary economic and political strategies of the Brazilian Foreign Policy, as it is seen as a profitable ground for the internationalization of Brazilian companies and also an important source of support of south-south initiatives at the multilateral level.30

In the promotion of the new Atlantic Strategy between Brazil and Africa, the Brazilian President Lula was an entrepreneur. Lula has engaged in 12 missions to Africa, having visited 23 African countries. As a consequence of the direct involvement of Lula in changing the contours of the relationship with Africa, the Brazilian Diplomacy has also amplified the strategy: the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs made 67 official visits to Africa, having visited 34 African countries. In addition, by the end of 2011, Brazil had representation in 37 of the 54 African countries.31

Differently from the Chinese and Indian forum-based rationale, the Brazilian policy for Africa during the period was an “(…) orchestrated strategy based on national interests and its protagonists, including entrepreneurs in charge of the expansion of Brazilian capitalism and diplomatic agents”32 while some national institutional mechanisms were developed to promote the mutual political and economic interests. In what concerns trade and FDI, the central institution during the period was the Brazilian “Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social” (BNDES).

After the interests of Brazil in Africa consolidated in the political and diplomatic circles, BNDES took a leading role in fostering both the economic and institutional presence of Brazil in Africa through its “Productive Development Policy” (PDP). Under the “Integrating with Africa” component of the PDP, BNDES developed in July/2009 a revised and comprehensive agenda for partnership between African and Brazilian partners, gravitating around three main

28 GLASSER, Susan. “The soft-power power”. In Foreign Policy 183 (December 2010).
32 Idem 30.
axes: (i) Stimulus for financing and investment (5 initiatives); (ii) International cooperation and knowledge-sharing (9 initiatives); (iii) Foreign trade support (6 initiatives).  

The first evaluation of the “Integrating with Africa” component of the PDP was conducted in 2010 and reported considerable progress when compared to the goals set for each axe. However, there have been modest changes in what concerns FDI, which was mainly concentrated in South Africa and Angola, where most of the Brazilian companies such as Vale, Petrobras, Camargo Correa, Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez and Queiroz Galvão are located. Although relying on partial data, The World Bank and IPEA note that Africa was far from being the main destination of Brazilian FDI during the period 2001-2009, when the Brazilian FDI in Africa actually fell from US$ 281 to US$ 124 million.

Finally, in what concerns trade, the exchanges between Brazil and the African region have grown considerably in the 2002-2012 period. However, as the World Bank and IPEA remark for a similar period (2000-2010), Africa’s share of the Brazilian trade fell considerably from nearly 7% in 2008 to 5.32% in 2010 due to the fall in commodity prices. Worth of mentioning is the fact that in 2009 nearly half of the exports to Africa were essentially food, an item with low aggregated value, while in the same year of 2009 the Brazilian capital goods exports represented only 5.7% of the total export value. Following a similar trend of the FDI, Brazilian capital goods exports in 2009 were concentrated in Angola and South Africa, representing nearly 70% of total exports for that year.

3. The Brazilian Cooperation with Africa: solidarity?

The last session of the article discussed that although there has been a strong political commitment during the Lula administration for fostering the relations between Brazil and Africa, the preliminary trade and FDI data does not (yet?) seem to indicate results comparable to the level of diplomatic efforts devoted to the strategy. If economic pragmatism is not the only defining trait, is solidarity the key ingredient of the Brazilian presence in Africa?

33. http://www.pdp.gov.br/Relatorios%20de%20Programas/Agenda%20de%20A%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20revisada%20_Africa_com1.pdf
35. Idem 31, pg 82.
36. LAUTENSCHLAGER, Alexandre & CATERMOL, Fabricio. “A participação das exportações brasileiras no comércio mundial de bens de capital para a África”. In BNDES Setorial, 34, 2010, pg 278-281.
Aside from other traditional principles that define Brazilian foreign affairs, the presence of Brazil in Africa during the 2002-2012 period can be characterized by the idea of “solidarity”. Solidarity, in this sense, means that Brazil had a role to play in the poverty-reduction efforts carried out by Southern countries, considering the Brazilian willingness to share and discuss new social technologies with its partners. Consequently, solidarity is radically different from the meaning proposed by the European Union, much closer to a legal understanding of the term, which implies cost-sharing. Lula has captured the link between international cooperation and the Brazilian foreign policy in the opening remarks for a study on the “Brazilian Cooperation for Development”, stating that, the international cooperation policies must be linked to the Brazilian foreign policy goals and rely on a “(...) comprehensive support structure in the State and in the Civil Society.”

Brazil sees its own fate linked to well-being of the community of States, in a “(...) dialectic relation between national interest and the exercise of solidarity”. Put bluntly, the international cooperation helps reducing inequalities among states and progressively endorses the idea of changing “from within”. During the period 2002-2012 it was, indeed, an instrument of the Brazilian Foreign Policy. Therefore, solidarity is a central concern of the Brazilian South-South cooperation when establishing partnerships with African countries.

In addition, it is important to understand how the discussion on solidarity and pragmatism may be intertwined, since both of them coexist and are not exclusive of other factors. It is also possible to state that one does not bring the other about automatically, but it is expected that one may reinforce the other in a short period of time, or least promote a more favorable context for the development of the other. For instance, selling heavy machinery may imply delivering training, and after that, sales services. Brazilian companies may insist on blurring the line between pragmatism and solidarity with that of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), insisting that they are willing to hire local workforce and granting effective technology transfer. Added to that, it is also true that building roads or schools will probably help Brazilian companies be more warmly welcomed. However, the increase in trade does not mean that cooperation will increase, once technical cooperation is focused on strengthening the State capacity for delivering public services.

Alike many other public policies conducted in democratic contexts, the Brazilian Foreign Policy of “solidarity” to Africa is essentially concerned with the provision of public goods and,

39 Idem 25, pg 225.
therefore, domestic distributive effects in Brazil are diffuse once no single group is directly or strongly affected. Less understood, however, are the inter-bureaucratic dynamics that arise during the design and implementation of the international cooperation projects and their relation to the foreign policy objectives.\textsuperscript{41} As one observer has precisely noted, “Brazil understands the CSS [South-South Cooperation] as an institutional act of providing public goods from its agencies and state organizations”.\textsuperscript{42} If international cooperation is an instrument of foreign policy and the former, in its turn, depends on the provision of public goods deriving from other public policy issue-areas, it seems logical to conclude that inter-bureaucratic (or inter-policy) politics may play an important role for explaining the implementation of the Brazilian foreign policy goals. To some extent, a recent analysis on the presence of Brazil in Haiti, Guinea and Bolivia confirms that conclusion by pointing out that the more consolidated a public policy issue-area is, the more it helps projecting Brazil internationally through cooperation initiatives.\textsuperscript{43}

Having said that, the domestic weight of a public policy seems to provide an important point of departure to understand which projects the analysis should focus on. In addition to the lenses for selecting the projects, it makes perfect sense to restrict the analysis to one specific location, so that the impacts of any project can be effectively measured and conjectures about the Brazilian local presence can be drawn. In this vein, the article turns its attention to a case-study of the “public administration” policy-area. Considering that the article also intends to draw conclusions on the effective presence of Brazil in Africa, Mozambique has been chosen as a privileged site for analysis. Finally, the article assumes that an effective presence can be best understood if the cooperation project has delivered tangible results in what concerns the goals set by the parties. The case-study seems to meet the criteria, considering that the actions delivered effective training for public civil servants and resulted in substantial changes of organizational practices at the Mozambique School of Government.

\textsuperscript{43} Idem 42, pg 12.
3.1 The “Support for the strategic-managerial development of the Government of Mozambique” Project.

The Brazilian National School of Public Administration (ENAP, in Portuguese) is a Public Foundation directly linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (MPOG, in Portuguese). It was created in 1986 to promote the development and training of the Brazilian public civil servants of the Federal Government, in order to enhance the ability of the Federal Government to manage public policies. International cooperation is an important component to the fulfillment of ENAP’s mission, considering that it is an instrument that allows the prospection, dissemination and exchange of knowledge and best practices in the issue-area of public administration/public policies.

ENAP itself was an institution whose functions and structure were inspired by a benchmark among the Schools of Government around the world, the French École nationale d’administration (ENA). Since its creation in 1986, ENAP has “received” international cooperation from several traditional “donors”. The international cooperation agreement with the Canadian School of Government, for example, has resulted in considerable improvements in the educational methodologies and also on the availability of courses in the field of developing leadership skills. A second, and recent, example of ENAP’s international cooperation was the development of a training course for practitioners of International Cooperation of the Federal Government, a partnership among ENAP, the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ, in German) and the Brazilian Agency for International Cooperation (ABC/MRE).

However, like many other public entities, through the years ENAP had accumulated considerable organizational knowledge and best practices. During the Brazilian Reform of the Public Sector period, conducted by Minister Luis Bresser Pereira under president Fernando Henrique Cardoso first and second terms (1994-1997 and 1998-2001) professional training became a strategy for disseminating the Reform’s objectives and priorities among public civil servants, as new techniques and concepts were brought into the Brazilian public sector. During President Lula’s two terms, ENAP also grew in importance as the Labor’s Party demands for developing leaders in the public sector became imperative. In addition, during Lula’s terms ENAP put forward considerable effort to coordinate the capacity-building initiatives among the 13 Federal schools of government and also to manage the dense

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network of all schools of government from the Federal, State and Local governments in Brazil.46

As discussed before, Lula’s administration provided an important link between the Brazilian foreign policy objectives to the practice of the international cooperation. The link instantly posed a new challenge for many public entities: they had to restructure their regular activities and processes in order to face demands from international partners. In other words, they needed internationalize. South-south cooperation projects between Brazil and other developing countries started popping up in many public entities, such as ENAP.

The international cooperation project between ENAP and the Institute for Public Administration of Mozambique (ISAP, in Portuguese) was the first South-South Cooperation project directly implemented by the School. ISAP’s role in the Government of Mozambique is very similar to ENAP’s. ISAP is directly linked to the Ministry of the Public Service (MFP, in Portuguese), an organ responsible for Public Administration/Management and also for managing the careers and public civil servant development. Like ENAP, ISAP is responsible for the coordination of the capacity-building initiatives of other local-level schools of government, the “Institutos de Formação em Administração Pública e Autárquica” (IFAPA). Finally, the development of human resources and competences was seen as an important element of MPF’s functions.

According to MFP and ISAP, joint work with ENAP would provide invaluable insights to deal with some issues of concern, such as: (i) Managing the “System for Training in Public Administration” (SIFAP, in Portuguese), an important tool for reversing the low-educational level of the public civil servants; (ii) Reformulating teaching strategies and educational methodologies; (iii) Training teachers and advisors; (iv) Expand the supply of courses to cope with the growing demands of capacity-building. Considering the issues presented by MFP and ISAP, ENAP proposed a cooperation project with two main objectives: (a) strengthen ISAP; (b) Develop technical and managerial competences among the public civil servants of Mozambique. As a consequence, the Agreement between the MFP and MPOG was signed in May 2009, while the international cooperation project between ISAP and ENAP was signed in April 2010. The project expected to graduate 413 students in 10 different professional training courses, a number that was later reviewed due to the fact that one course representing 120 students had to be cancelled. As a result of the project, 272 students graduated in 9 different courses.

Although the project seemed to return positive results in comparison to the goals that have been set in the occasion of its signature between the parties, the initial indicators were

46 http://www2.enap.gov.br/rede_escolas/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1
designed to measure the effectiveness in terms of delivering services and goods. In other words, little inferences could be drawn on the impact of the 272 fresh graduates in the practices and processes inside the public administration of Mozambique, the essence of the two objectives that have been agreed. Bearing this problem in mind, ENAP proposed to develop a qualitative research with the participants of the courses in Mozambique and the teams that were involved in managing the project. 31 questionnaires were applied through face-to-face interviews and 22 former students filled the questionnaires sent by email, leading to a total of 53 participants.

The questionnaires resulted from a thorough discussion between ENAP and ABC/MRE staff members on which indicators would best capture the project results. The shared opinion among the participants was that the project had impacts that went much further than declared results, a common perception in educational projects. In other words, ENAP and ABC were searching for a methodology that would capture the successive “waves of impact” of the project in the organizational structures.

Based on the “waves of impact” idea, ENAP proposed that the results were divided in three waves, according to which organizational instance the project had impacted: (i) Agents (public servants); (ii) Organization (ISAP); (iii) Government (relations among state institutions). In addition, the general objectives were split into eight specific objectives and associated with one of the three layers. Based on this idea, ENAP organized a workshop with ABC members to discuss which indicators would best capture the results, based on the three-layer methodology. As a result, eleven indicators were set for the first layer (individual), two for the second layer (organizational), and six for the third layer (government). For measuring the indicators, nine questionnaires were developed. Some participants were interviewed face-to-face and all the former students received the questionnaire by email.

Based on the methodology, ENAP was able to infer that the impacts of the project went much further than those expected at the beginning. Indicators revealed that in addition to absorbing the contents of the courses, the public civil servants, especially from ISAP, were able to reflect about their daily behavior and propose improvements and changes in organizational practices. In the case of ISAP, indicators demonstrated that the number of courses offered by the school increased 189%, the number of enrolled students increased 134%, teachers reported they were more confident in their role of facilitators and course designers, and ISAP staff from all levels remarked that organizational practices had to be reviewed or either changed. Finally, all the participants considered that the cooperation project was directly linked to the goals and strategies set in the Public Sector Reform (2006-2011).
4. Conclusions

This research led to the conclusion that other political dynamics than those stated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC/MRE) play a significant role in the Brazilian technical cooperation, considering that it was a tool for the Brazilian foreign policy during 2002-2012. When partner countries do demand Brazil for international cooperation projects, it is likely that positive responses are linked to solid market opportunities and/or pre-existing political ties to Brazil, such as Mozambique. In that sense, “pragmatism” and “solidarity” should be analyzed together, as one contribute to understand the other, but only on a case-by-case approach. In addition, it can be stated that a pragmatic approach to Africa operates at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Cabinet levels, whilst public agencies like ENAP operate in a rather technical and narrow idea of international cooperation, closer to the idea of “solidarity”. However, it should also be noted that the internationalization of some sectors of the Brazilian bureaucracy may also lead to an important inter-bureaucratic competition for funds, prestige and power. Such policy-level politics in Brazil may play a significant role in explaining the internationalization of some policy areas as the demand for technical cooperation grows in Brazil.

Considering that Africa has a growing importance for emerging power relations, Brazil must work towards developing a clear methodology for understanding its material presence in the continent. As the project implemented by ENAP illustrates, developing consensual methodologies and indicators for presence/impact allow decision-makers to avoid general guiding categories, such as pragmatism and solidarity, in favor of cost-benefit analysis, links among agendas, and comparative analysis of national policy objectives/practices among emerging powers. The effort can also facilitate the domestic coordination of the bureaucratic agencies involved in international cooperation, foreign policy and trade, as well as strengthening the coordinative role of the Brazilian embassies in African countries.